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ARTICLES
THE LOST CONTROVERSY LIMITATION OF THE
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
Stephen E. Friedman *
Despite Congress's deliberate limitation of the Federal
Arbitration (the "FAA") to disputes arising out of a con-
tract containing an arbitration provision, broader arbi-
tration provisions are ubiquitous. Courts invariably en-
force such provisions under the FAA. Notably, the
Supreme Court has almost entirely disregarded the rele-
vant language of the FAA and has ignored the conflict be-
tween the FAA's narrow language and the broad lan-
guage typically found in arbitration provisions. In so
doing, the Court has quietly and inappropriately elevated
the language of private agreements above the language of
the statute.
In this article, Professor Friedman first identifies the
origin of the Court's disregard for the FAA's language.
Second, he describes the conflict between the narrow lan-
guage of the statute and the broad language found in ar-
bitration agreements. Third, Professor Friedman de-
scribes and critiques both the judicial disregard of this
conflict and the corresponding expansion of the FAA's
scope. Finally, he urges courts to focus on the language of
the FAA to limit the statute's scope to only those contro-
versies that Congress intended.
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, Wilmington, Dela-
ware; J.D., 1992, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1989, Yale College. I am very grateful to
many people for their insights and encouragement. I owe particular thanks to Sue Fried-
man, David Horton, John Massaro, and Doretta Massardo McGininis for their helpful
comments.
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The Supreme Court has elevated private arbitration agree-
ments above the primary statute that governs them. This em-
powering of private parties at the expense of Congress has result-
ed in a proliferation of extremely broad arbitration provisions. An
arbitration provision enforced in a recent case is illustrative. A
provision in an employment contract compelled the parties to ar-
bitrate "any legal or equitable claim, demand, or controversy,
whether in tort, in contract, or under statute which relates to,
arises from, concerns, or involves [the employment] in any way."
For good measure, the provision also required the arbitration of
"any other matter related to the relationship between the Em-
ployee and the [employer], including, by way of example and
without limitation, allegations of prohibited forms of employment
discrimination such as discrimination based on race, religion, col-
or, sex or age."2 Such a provision is certainly broad enough to cov-
er alleged violations of federal and state statutes. Accordingly,
when a fired employee sued for violation of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and the New Mexico Human Rights Act,' the court enforced the
arbitration provision under the Federal Arbitration Act (the
"FAA"),4 staying the litigation and compelling the parties to arbi-
trate.'
While the claims were surely within the extremely broad arbi-
tration clause, they were also well outside the scope of the FAA.
The court did not discuss the possibility that the controversy was
beyond the FAA's scope, nor, apparently, did the former employee
argue the point. Such silence is a function of jurisprudence that
has almost completely written out key language restricting the
FAA's scope. The language the Supreme Court has largely ig-
nored is the statute's limitation to arbitrate a controversy only if
it "aris[es] out of' a contract with an arbitration provision or
"aris[es] out of' the failure to perform that contract.6 The author
refers to this as the FAA's "controversy limitation." This article
challenges the judicial disregard of the controversy limitation.
1. Parrish v. Valero Retail Holdings, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (D.N.M. 2010).
2. Id. at 1269-70.
3. Id. at 1270 (citations omitted).
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
5. Parrish, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-82 (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4; Adair Bus Sales, Inc.
v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994)).
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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The matter is of great significance. Arbitration provisions that
exceed the scope of the FAA are quite common, and it is often the
party with superior bargaining power, such as an employer, who
insists on such a provision. The arbitration provision described
above is quite typical.! Courts invariably enforce such broad pro-
visions, resulting in a massive expansion of the FAA both out-
ward, to include all manner of statutory claims, and inward, to
include disputes over the arbitration provision itself.
This expansion is very much at odds with the language and leg-
islative history of the FAA, both of which make clear that Con-
gress intended the FAA to apply only to contract disputes arising
out of an agreement that contains an arbitration provision. The
origin of this expansion is somewhat surprising, lying as it does
in early Supreme Court jurisprudence that resisted an expansive
scope for the FAA. The relevant cases based their resistance on
skepticism towards arbitration. Had those earlier decisions been
based instead on the language of the FAA and the congressional
intent it reflected, the FAA's scope might be far more modest-
and consistent with congressional intent-than it is today.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides some basic
background on the FAA and its four limitations, which the author
refers to as the "form limitation," the "constitutional limitation,"
the "state law limitation," and, of course, the controversy limita-
tion. It also describes the conflict between the language and scope
of the FAA and the language and scope of typical arbitration pro-
visions. Part II discusses some early resistance to the current
broad scope of the FAA. It then analyzes the Supreme Court's
more recent practice of ignoring the language of the FAA and de-
ferring to the broader language in arbitration provisions. Part III
critiques that practice, presenting the argument that Congress
intended only contract disputes arising out of the underlying con-
tract to fall within the scope of the FAA. Finally, Part IV identi-
fies and addresses various objections to the argument that courts
should adhere to the language of the controversy limitation in or-
der to effectuate the intent of Congress.
7. See discussion infra Part I.D.
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE FAA AND ITS FOUR LIMITATIONS
A. A Brief History of the FAA
The FAA applies both to agreements to arbitrate disputes that
might later arise (i.e., "pre-dispute arbitration agreements") and
to agreements to arbitrate existing disputes.! This article ad-
dresses only pre-dispute arbitration provisions. Prior to the pas-
sage of the FAA and similar state laws, courts were often quite
hostile towards the enforcement of such pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. This hostility took two basic forms. First, courts typ-
ically permitted either party to a contract to revoke a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement any time before the arbitrators issued an
award.! Second, even if arbitration provisions were deemed valid,
courts were reluctant to enforce them in equity and typically re-
fused either to stay litigation or to compel the parties to proceed
in arbitration.o
A number of explanations for this hostility have been proposed.
Courts may have been hesitant to enforce arbitration agreements
that would "oust the jurisdiction" of the courts in favor of arbitra-
tors" (a rationale that was derided as illogicall2 and unworthy of
judicial adoption"). Judicial resistance to arbitration may have
been based on a concern that stronger parties would take ad-
vantage of weaker parties and compel them to "sign away their
rights," thus "tak[ing] away the rights of the weaker" parties.14 Or
it may simply have been that courts felt constrained to follow
precedent even if they disagreed with, or no longer knew, the rea-
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
10. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924) ("[I]t is very old law that the performance
of a written agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in equity, and that if an action
at law were brought on the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agree-
ment could not be pleaded in bar of the action. . . .").
11. See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983-84
(2d Cir. 1942) (quoting Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); 1 Wils. K.B. 129)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 985.
13. U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrol. Co., 222 F. 1006, 1007 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
14. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 15 (1924)
[hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New
York State Chamber of Commerce) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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soning behind it." Whatever the reasons for such judicial hostili-
ty, it was firmly entrenched in the early twentieth century. 16
The business community led a concerted effort to eliminate this
judicial hostility towards pre-dispute arbitration provisions." The
1920 passage of an arbitration statute in New York State was a
major victory. Under the New York Arbitration Law, a "provision
in a written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising between the parties . . . shall be valid, enforceable
and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."" Further, the New
York statute provided a mechanism for the specific enforcement
of arbitration provisions. The law empowered-actually it re-
quired-a court to stay litigation of issues that were referable to
arbitration under the parties' agreement.20 Similarly, the law em-
powered and required a court to enter an order that arbitration
proceed if the court was satisfied that the parties had made an
arbitration agreement and that one of the parties had failed to
comply with the agreement.2' New Jersey followed suit in 1923,
15. See, e.g., U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co., 222 F. at 1007, 1009-10, 1012 (sharply criticizing
the rule of revocability but upholding it due to the rule's firmly settled nature); Berkovitz
v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921) (citations omitted) (noting that
judicial hostility has been criticized by many courts who nonetheless felt bound to express
similar hostility "in deference to early precedents"); Henry v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 64 A.
635, 636 (Pa. 1906) (noting that it was "much to be regretted that agreements to arbi-
trate . . . should be excepted from the general law of contracts and treated as revocable by
one party without consent of the other" but upholding the rule of revocability as "too firm-
ly settled to be changed without legislative authority").
16. See WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS
45 (1930) (noting that the hostility towards pre-dispute arbitration provisions was "almost
universally accepted by the American courts").
17. See Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration
in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 247-48 (1931) (describing efforts of the
business community to ensure passage of legislation favoring arbitration); W.H.H. Piatt et
al., The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 153 (1925)
(noting that the bill that became the FAA "was supported by business organizations from
every part of the country").
18. See J.P. Chamberlain, The Commercial Arbitration Law, 9 A.B.A. J. 523, 524
(1923) (citing An Act in Relation to Arbitration, Constituting Chapter Seventy-Two of the
Consolidated Laws, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803).
19. New York Arbitration Law § 2 (1920), reprinted in A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 92 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501 (CONSOL. 2007)).
20. New York Arbitration Law § 5 (1920), reprinted in A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 111 (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503
(CONSOL. 2007)).
21. New York Arbitration Law § 3 (1920), reprinted in A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 118 (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7503
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passing its own arbitration statute largely patterned on the New
York legislation.22
There is a crucial difference, however, between the New York
and New Jersey statutes. The relevant controversy limitation of
the New Jersey statute is quite a bit narrower than the one found
in the New York statute. Congress selected the narrower lan-
guage from the New Jersey statute for the FAA." As the author
discusses in more detail later, this choice by Congress is quite
significant."
Congress passed the FAA (originally titled the United States
Arbitration Act) in 1925.25 As with the New York Arbitration Law,
a key purpose of the FAA was to reverse judicial hostility towards
26pre-dispute arbitration provisions and to ensure the enforce-
ment of private arbitration agreements." According to the House
Committee Report, "[a]rbitration agreements are purely matters
of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the con-
tracting party live up to his agreement."2  The FAA "declares
simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced,
and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforce-
ment."29
B. Overview of the FAA's Key Provisions
The "key ... provisions" of the FAA are Sections 2 through 4."
Section 2 of the FAA ("Section 2"), described by the Supreme
(CONSOL. 2007)).
22. IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 42-43 (1992) (describing New Jer-
sey's passage of a bill patterned closely on the New York Arbitration Law).
23. See discussion infra Part III.A.
24. See discussion infra Part III.A.
25. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883, 883-86 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
26. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. , , 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745
(2011) (citing Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)).
27. Id. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). The Court in Concepcion indicated that
the enforcement of arbitration provisions according to their terms served Congress's goal
of promoting arbitration. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
28. H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
29. Id. at 2. Similarly, the Senate Committee Report indicates that the legislation was
motivated primarily by a need to undo the rule of revocability and to empower the federal
courts to enforce arbitration agreements. See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
30. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
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Court as the FAA's "centerpiece provision""' and "substantive
mandate,"" undoes in a few sentences the judicial hostility
against arbitration. Section 2 also sets forth the scope and cover-
age of the FAA." Section 2 provides, with respect to pre-dispute
arbitration provisions, that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . .. shall be val-
id, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
The FAA also provides a mechanism for the enforcement of ar-
bitration provisions. Section 3 of the FAA ("Section 3") makes it
possible for a party to enforce an arbitration provision by obtain-
ing a stay of litigation when the other party has brought a law-
suit on an issue covered by an arbitration agreement." Section 4
of the FAA ("Section 4") enables a party to petition a court for an
order compelling arbitration and requires the court to grant such
a motion so long as the "making of the agreement for arbitration"
and the "failure to comply" with the agreement are not at issue."
C. The Three "Non-Lost" Limitations
In addition to the controversy limitation, the FAA contains
three other limitations. These limitations can be characterized as
a form limitation, a constitutional limitation, and a state law lim-
itation.
31. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 64 (2009) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
32. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, _, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009).
33. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (describing Sec-
tion 2 as the FAA's "coverage provision").
34. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
35. The Court has stated that the "parties" referred to in Section 3 who are empow-
ered to seek a stay of litigation are the parties to the litigation, not the parties to the con-
tract. Carlisle, 556 U.S. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 1901 n.4 (2009).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
37. Id. § 4. If either or both of these matters are at issue, the court is to proceed to a
summary trial on such issues. Id.
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1. The Form Limitation
The FAA limits its coverage to "written provision[s]" to arbi-
trate." There probably is not a great deal to say about this form
limitation (although I have tried)." Some have described this
written form limitation as serving a "Statute of Frauds" purpose
of providing evidence of the agreement to arbitrate.40 It seems
more likely that the purpose of this requirement is to register the
seriousness of the parties about agreeing to arbitrate."
The term "written provision" is not defined in the FAA. 42 The
Court touched on it briefly but only to indicate that a party seek-
ing to enforce an arbitration agreement need not be a signatory
of, or even a party to, the "written agreement."" Although the
Court has not said much about the form limitation, this has not
been neglect. Whether an arbitration provision is written or not is
simply not often in dispute.
2. The Constitutional Limitation
In addition to a form limitation, the FAA also includes a consti-
tutional limitation. The Supreme Court has held that "it is clear
beyond dispute that the [FAA] is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate com-
merce and over admiralty."'4 4 The FAA is accordingly limited to
written arbitration provisions that are either "in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
38. Id. § 2; see also id. § 3 (referring to an "agreement in writing" for arbitration); id. §
4 (referring to a "written agreement for arbitration").
39. See Stephen E. Friedman, Protecting Consumers from Arbitration Provisions in
Cyberspace, the Federal Arbitration Act and E-SIGN Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REV.
377, 395-96 (2008) (discussing FAA's requirement of a writing).
40. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Autonomy, Cooperation
and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 182 (1999) (characterizing the
Section 2 writing limitation as a "Statute of Frauds" Limitation); see also Nghiem v. NEC
Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that an employee handbook and
an employee letter constituted a "writing memorializing an agreement to arbitrate" and
thus satisfied the "written" requirement).
41. I have previously set this argument out at some length. See Friedman, supra note
39, at 405.
42. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
43. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, _, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902-03
(2009).
44. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).
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commerce."45 The FAA defines the term "commerce" to mean,
among other things, "commerce among the several States" (i.e.,
"interstate commerce").46
The Court addressed the meaning of the term "involving com-
merce" in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, determining that
"involving commerce" was broader than "in commerce," which the
Court described as a term of art covering "'only persons or activi-
ties within the flow of interstate commerce."'4 ' A careful assess-
ment of the FAA's "language, background, and structure" (includ-
ing a consideration of the FAA's legislative history and definitions
found in a dictionary contemporaneous with the passage of the
FAA) led the Court to conclude that "involving commerce" was
"the functional equivalent of 'affecting' [commerce]."" This hold-
ing expanded the scope of the FAA because "affecting commerce"
is the language Congress uses to denote its intent to exercise the
full extent of its power under the Commerce Clause.49
The contrast between the Supreme Court's close parsing of the
"involving commerce" language of the constitutional limitation in
Section 2 and the Court's failure to engage in a similar searching
inquiry of the meaning of the words in the controversy limitation
is striking."o
3. The State Law Limitation
The last of the FAA limitations courts typically focus on is the
state law limitation. The FAA leaves state law some role in limit-
ing the enforceability of arbitration provisions, which is particu-
larly important in light of the Court's holding in Southland Corp.
v. Keating that the FAA constitutes a body of substantive law
45. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
46. Id. § 1.
47. 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422
U.S. 271, 276 (1975)).
48. Id. at 273-74. The Court referred to the 1933 edition of the OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY. I return to this dictionary in a subsequent section. See discussion infra Part
IV.A.
49. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 273 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859
(1985)). Several years later, the Court reiterated its view that "involving commerce" is
broader than "in commerce" and also made clear that the specific transactions at issue
need not, in and of themselves, have a "substantial effect on interstate commerce" so long
as the general type of activity, in the aggregate, implicates interstate commerce. Citizens
Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003).
50. See discussion infra Parts II.C-D.
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that is binding on state courts.1 The savings clause of Section 2
makes arbitration provisions enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract."5 To be enforceable under the FAA, the arbitration provi-
sion must pass muster under such state laws."
Courts have addressed the issue as one of preemption, though
precisely which state laws are preempted and which are not is a
difficult question (and one which this article does not address in
any depth). The Court has drawn a line between state laws that
'arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally,"' on the one hand (these
types of state laws are permissible under the FAA), and those
that take their "'meaning precisely from the fact that a contract
to arbitrate is at issue' (these types of laws are preempted by the
FAA).5' Accordingly, arbitration provisions are subject to general
contract doctrines, such as unconscionability, fraud, and duress.5
However, laws that "singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect
status," such as a requirement that arbitration provisions be par-
ticularly prominent, are preempted.
The Court recently attempted to clarify the murky line between
acceptable state laws and ones the FAA has preempted. In AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court addressed an application
of the California unconscionability doctrine that deemed class ac-
tion waivers in consumer adhesion contracts unenforceable in
some circumstances." The Court held that this rule was preempt-
ed by the FAA." The Court noted that a state law might appear
arbitration-neutral on its face but may still be applied in a way
that disfavors arbitration." Such a situation poses a "complex"
51. 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
52. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
53. See id.
54. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (quoting Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 483 n.9 (1987)).
55. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776
(2010) (quoting Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687) (indicating that arbitration provisions can be
invalidated under the doctrines of fraud, duress, and unconscionability).
56. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
57. 563 U.S. _, _ , 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744-46 (2011) (citing Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)) (summarizing California's Discover Bank rule that deems
"most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts ... unconscionable").
58. Id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
59. See id. at , 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.2).
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problem."o The Court concluded that the savings clause was not
intended to preserve state law rules "that stand as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives," including the objec-
tive of promoting arbitration." According to the Court, the Cali-
fornia law at issue did stand as an obstacle to the promotion of
arbitration and, hence, was preempted.62 Although Concepcion
left things less than clear, it appears the state law limitation
means that arbitration provisions must pass muster under those
state laws that neither single out arbitration for unfavorable
treatment on their face nor stand as an obstacle to the promotion
of arbitration." It is likely that a great deal of litigation in coming
years will address what it means to stand as an obstacle to the
promotion of arbitration.
The Court may or may not be correct in its jurisprudence on
the state law limitation, but it has certainly not ignored it.
D. The Controversy Limitation and the Arbitration Agreements
that Exceed It
Having addressed the form limitation, the constitutional limi-
tation, and the state law limitation, we can now turn to the much
ignored controversy limitation of Section 2.
Section 2 limits the FAA's coverage to provisions "to settle by
arbitration a controversy . .. arising out of such contract [(i.e., a
contract evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce)] or
transaction [(i.e., a maritime agreement)], or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof."" That language is simple,
and one might expect parties to draft arbitration provisions that
track it in order to ensure enforcement under the statute. But
they do not. They go well beyond it.
60. Id.
61. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (citing Crosby v. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, 540
U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000); Geir v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000)).
62. Id. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-52 (citations omitted).
63. Locating the line between permissible and preempted state law is a difficult task,
even after Concepcion. Professor Hiro Aragaki has argued that we should look to the juris-
prudence in anti-discrimination law for guidance in drawing this line. Hiro N. Aragaki,
Arbitration's Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1237-39 (2011).
64. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Section 2 also covers agreements to arbitrate existing dis-
putes, an issue that this article does not address. Id.
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The major providers of arbitration services have encouraged
the use of language exceeding the scope of Section 2. The Ameri-
can Arbitration Association" (the "AAA") counsels parties draft-
ing arbitration agreements to include not only disputes arising
out of, but also those merely "relating to," the contract," even
though such language is not found in Section 2. The AAA recom-
mended clause is as follows: "Any controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be set-
tled by arbitration administered by the [AAA]."" Parties often
adopt this language." JAMS, another major provider of arbitra-
tion services," also recommends language exceeding the scope of
the FAA, suggesting a "standard arbitration clause" for commer-
cial contracts that subjects to arbitration "[a]ny dispute, claim, or
controversy arising out of or relating to [the] Agreement or the
breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity
thereof."o
The language suggested by the AAA and JAMS reaches out-
ward to include controversies well beyond the contractual core of
the FAA. Additionally, both organizations seek to facilitate and
encourage an extensive inward reach for arbitration provisions.
That is, both organizations seek to ensure that disputes about the
arbitration provision itself, as opposed to disputes about the un-
derlying contract, are subject to arbitration. The language sug-
gested by JAMS subjects to arbitration many disputes about the
arbitration provision itself, "including the determination of the
65. The AAA describes itself as the "largest [Alternative Dispute Resolution] provider
worldwide." Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARBITRATION AsS'N, http://www.adr.org/
(open "Services" menu; then follow "Dispute Resolution Services" hyperlink) (last visited
May 1, 2012).
66. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE 7 (2007) [hereinafter DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES].
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Lowrey v. Tritan Grp., Ltd., No. 3:08-cv-00779, 2009 WL 2136159, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. July 14, 2009) (involving an arbitration agreement that uses the AAA sug-
gested language); Brown v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. CV 08-00779 MMM
(SHx), 2008 WL 2128057, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2008) (same); Goldleaf Fin. Solutions,
Inc. v. Merchs. & Planters Bank, No. 3:07-0998, 2008 WL220263, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan.
25, 2008) (same).
69. JAMS describes itself as "the largest private alternative dispute resolution ...
provider in the world." About JAMS, JAMS: ARBITRATION, MEDIATION, AND ADR
SERVICES, http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutusoverview/ (last visited May 1, 2012).
70. JAMS, JAMS CLAUSE WORKBOOK: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
CLAUSES FOR COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2 (2011) (emphasis added).
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scope or applicability" of the arbitration provision. In addition,
Rule 7 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules, which is fre-
quently adopted by parties in their arbitration agreements,72 pro-
vides that "[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or
her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement."
These providers of arbitration services suggest this language in
order to expand the scope of arbitration agreements. The AAA
advises that its suggested language "makes clear that all disputes
are arbitrable."74 JAMS's suggested language is designed to "pro-
vide a simple means of assuring that any future dispute [s] will be
arbitrated."
It is perfectly understandable that the AAA and JAMS would
urge parties to include the broadest range of controversies within
their arbitration agreements, but the FAA does not include the
arbitration of "all" or "any" disputes in its scope. It includes only a
much narrower universe of controversies.
Another popular (and broad) variant adopts the "relating to"
language and explicitly incorporates an almost limitless range of
disputes. Some recent examples of this variant are as follows:
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this
Agreement or the relationships which result from this Agreement, or
the validity of this arbitration clause or the entire Agreement, shall
be resolved by binding arbitration .... The parties agree and under-
stand that all disputes arising under case law, statutory law, and all
other laws including, but not limited to, all contract, tort, and prop-
erty disputes, will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with
76
this agreement.
All disputes, claims, or controversies between Dealer and [a supplier
of fuel] and/or any of [supplier's] employees, arising from or relating
to this Contract, the making of this Contract or the validity of this
arbitration clause, shall be resolved by binding arbitration .... The
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 2009) (involving an
arbitration provision that incorporates the rule); Barkl v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 10-3565
ADM/JJG, 2010 WL 4979231, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2010) (same).
73. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES R. 7(a) (2009).
74. DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES, supra note 66, at 8.
75. JAMS, supra note 70, at 2.
76. Olivieri v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 4:08-cv-3234-TLW-TER, 2010 WL
972811, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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parties agree and understand that all disputes arising under case
law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but not limited to,
all contract, tort, fraud and property disputes, will be subject to bind-
77ing arbitration in accord with this Contract.
All disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to this
Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract, or the
validity of this arbitration clause or the entire Contract, shall, at the
election of either party, be resolved by binding arbitration . . . . The
parties agree and understand that all disputes arising under case
law, statutory law, and all other laws including, but not limited to,
all contract, tort, and property disputes, will be subject to binding
78
arbitration in accordance with this Contract.
All of these provisions were enforced under the FAA without
any discussion of the fact that they exceed the FAA.7 ' The next
Part describes how we got to this point.
II. HOW THE LIMITATION WAS LOST: THE COURT EXPANDS THE
FAA BOTH OUTWARD AND INWARD
This Part of the article begins by discussing some relatively
early resistance from the Supreme Court to the nearly all-
encompassing controversy scope that currently prevails. As de-
scribed below, this resistance was not based on the language of
the FAA-indeed, such language was virtually ignored by the
Court. Instead, this resistance was based on concerns about the
capability of arbitrators to decide the specific statutory claims at
issue. But once those concerns were allayed, there was really no
stopping the expansion of the FAA. Without the language of the
statute to guide or restrain it, the Court has expanded the scope
of the FAA rather dramatically, both outward and inward.
A. Initial Resistance
On a few notable occasions the Court has shown some re-
sistance to a virtually all-encompassing controversy scope for the
77. Lafayette Texaco, Inc. v. Smith, No. 3:08cv406-MHT, 2010 WL 653494, at *3
(M.D. Ala. Feb. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Agnew v. Honda Motor Co., No. 1:08-cv-01433-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 1813783, at *1
(S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. See Lafayette Texaco, 2010 WL 653494, at *4 (enforcing arbitration provision
without discussing difference between language of the FAA and language of the arbitra-




FAA. Two leading cases in this regard are Wilko v. Swan8 o and
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 81 each of which expressed skep-
ticism about the arbitrability of federal statutory claims under
the FAA. Critically, neither of these cases involved any discussion
of the actual language of the controversy limitation. Instead, they
based their resistance on skepticism about the competence of ar-
bitrators.
In Wilko, a 1953 opinion, the Court held that an agreement to
arbitrate a claim under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933
(the "SEA of 1933") was not enforceable under the FAA.82 The
Court noted that the SEA of 1933 had been passed to "protect in-
vestors" by requiring various types of full and fair disclosure
about securities." The Court also recognized that the FAA estab-
lished "by statute the desirability of arbitration as an alternative
to the complications of litigation."" The "hospitable attitude . . .
toward arbitration," however, was not sufficient to lead to a con-
clusion that the claims under the SEA of 1933 were arbitrable."
Instead, the Court expressed concerns that the case required
"subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
violator of the Act. They must be not only determined but applied
by the arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law."86 The
Court continued, noting that "[a]s their award may be made
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete rec-
ord of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal
meaning of [various statutory requirements] cannot be exam-
ined."" The Court held that the "protective provisions of the [SEA
of 1933] require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure
their effectiveness" and that arbitration of claims arising under
this Act would not be appropriate.
The Wilko Court thus based its holding entirely on its assess-
ment of the desirability of the arbitration of claims under the
80. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
81. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
82. 346 U.S. at 438.
83. Id. at 431 (citing Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74, 74, 77; A.C.
Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941); Okla.-Tex. Trust v. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, 100 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1939); S. Rep. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 432.
86. Id. at 435-36.
87. Id. at 436 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 437 (citations omitted).
2012]1 1019
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
SEA of 1933." The language of Section 2 played no role in its de-
cision-indeed, the Court neither quoted nor cited Section 2 and
even indicated that while arbitration of claims under the SEA of
1933 was not desirable, arbitration of other statutory claims un-
der the FAA might not present a problem."
The Court's 1974 decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
may be its most extensive articulation of mistrust of the arbitral
process when it comes to noncontractual claims, although the rel-
evant language in the case was largely dicta." Again, there was
no discussion of the key language of the FAA. Instead, the Court
discussed the comparative benefits of litigation as opposed to ar-
bitration in the context of violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.92 The Court noted that "[a]rbitral procedures,
while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final res-
olution of rights created by Title VII."" The Court rested its con-
clusion "on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to ef-
fectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of
enacted legislation."9 4 The Court further noted that the arbitra-
tors' specialized competence "pertains primarily to the law of the
shop, not the law of the land. Parties usually choose an arbitrator
because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the
demands and norms of industrial relations."" In contrast, "the
resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary re-
sponsibility of [the] courts."96 The Court in Gardner-Denver, at
least in the above-referenced dicta, articulated a view that arbi-
tration was at its most appropriate when it comes to the resolu-
tion of contractual claims." But the Court did not ground its
analysis in the controversy language of Section 2 (just as it had
not in Wilko)." This failure laid the foundation for a dramatic ex-
89. See id. at 431.
90. See id. at 431-32 (citations omitted) (indicating hope for the usefulness of the FAA
in controversies based on statutes).
91. See Makins v. District of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
92. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 56-57.
95. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 56.
98. Compare id. at 58-60, with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431-32 (1953).
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pansion of the AAA scope when the Supreme Court's view of arbi-
tration changed.
B. From Skeptic to Cheerleader
The skepticism towards arbitration expressed by the Court in
Wilko and Gardner-Denver has been replaced by something very
different as the Court has become a true believer in the effective-
ness and appropriateness of arbitration in virtually all contexts.
Soon after Gardner-Denver, a "radical change . .. in the Court's
receptivity to arbitration" occurred." In various opinions, the
Court criticized its own earlier skepticism towards arbitration
and expressed a much more positive view of the desirability of ar-
bitration. For example, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc.,'o which overruled Wilko,'0' the Court crit-
icized Wilko for its hostility and suspicion towards arbitration
and stated that the earlier case had "fallen far out of step with
our current strong endorsement of' arbitration as a means for re-
solving statutory claims. 0 2 Similarly, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court noted that we were
''well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited
the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution."o' Accordingly, the Court held that antitrust claims
were subject to arbitration under the FAA."o'
Similarly, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
the Court criticized the outdated "mistrust of the arbitral process"
harbored by the Court in Wilko.o' The Court noted that "arbitral
tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal
complexities of antitrust claims."106 In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
the Court held that arbitrators were fully capable of handling
99. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 (1998) (noting a shift in
the Court's attitude towards arbitration from negative to favorable from the 1970s to the
1990s).
100. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
101. Id. at 485.
102. Id. at 481.
103. 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).
104. Id. at 625, 640.
105. 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
106. Id. at 232.
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claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,'07 and it
criticized Gardner-Denver as having been permeated by an out-
dated mistrust and suspicion towards arbitration that the Court
had since rejected.08
Because the original resistance to an expansive scope of the
FAA had been grounded in suspicion about arbitration (instead of
being grounded in the language of the FAA), once that skepticism
ended there was nothing to prevent a limitless expansion of the
FAA except for the language of the FAA. The Court has, however,
largely disregarded that language.
C. Expanding the FAA Outward by Ignoring Its Language
The Court has routinely enforced arbitration provisions with-
out pausing to consider whether the scope of these provisions ex-
ceeds the language of the FAA.o' In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co., for example, the arbitration provi-
sion at issue stated: "Any controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled
by arbitration.""10 The Supreme Court described this as "a broad
arbitration clause.""' But it is more than broad; it is actually
broader than the language of Section 2, which does not include
the "relating to" language.112 The Court did not comment at all on
that discrepancy."'
107. 556 U.S. 247, 269 (2009).
108. Id. at 265-70.
109. In a fascinating article, Professor David Horton argues that the Court's reading of
the FAA over the years has given rise to "an impermissible private delegation" in which
private parties are essentially given the power to craft law. David Horton, Arbitration as
Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 480 (2011). That is, companies have been given almost
complete authority to craft whatever procedural rules they wish for the resolution of dis-
putes. Id. at 480. The problem is compounded by the fact that such procedures are typical-
ly imposed unilaterally. See id. In a sense, the phenomenon of disregarding the language
of the controversy limitation is another such instance of delegation. The Supreme Court
has read (or, more accurately, ignored) the FAA in such a way as to permit private parties
to draft their own controversy limitation language without regard to the statute itself.
110. 388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
113. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 397-98; see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mer-
cury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1983) (describing an arbitration provision covering all
disputes "arising out of, or relating to" a contract or its breach as "broad" without noting




Ignoring the statutory language has had a significant impact.
Consider, for example, the crucial case of Southland Corp. v.
Keating."4 Although Keating was not the first Supreme Court
opinion to sanction the arbitration of noncontractual claims,"' the
opinion expanded the scope of the FAA in a significant way. Keat-
ing made clear that the FAA included agreements to arbitrate
controversies arising out of state statutes."' The arbitration pro-
vision in Keating was of the "broad" variety and, in relevant re-
spects, was identical to the one found in Prima Paint."' It provid-
ed for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof.""' The claim at
issue arose under the California Franchise Investment Law."' In
a stark example of simply ignoring the controversy limitation out
of existence, the Court, in assessing whether the statutory claims
were within the FAA, stated "[w]e discern only two limitations on
the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the
[FAA]."120
Only two? Which two made the cut? According to the Court, the
arbitration provision "must be part of a written maritime contract
or a contract 'evidencing a transaction involving commerce' and
such clauses may be revoked upon 'grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.""' This description ac-
tually accounts for three of the four limitations found in the FAA:
the form limitation, the state law limitation, and the constitu-
tional limitation. But it completely ignores the controversy limi-
tation.
114. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
115. For instance, shortly after rendering its Gardner-Denver decision, the Court de-
cided Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), in which it permitted arbitration
of claims that had been brought under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 509,
519-20. The Court distinguished Wilho largely based on the international nature of the
transaction in Scherk, which complicated the question of which country's law should apply
to disputes arising out of the contract. Id. at 515-16. The Court also noted that in transac-
tions of an international nature a "contractual provision specifying in advance the forum
in which disputes shall be litigated . .. is ... an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business
transaction." Id. at 516.
116. Keating, 465 U.S. at 10-11.
117. Id. at 15 n.7 (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, 406).
118. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10-11.
121. Id. at 11 (footnote omitted).
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What is even stranger is that the issue was squarely before the
Court. One of the parties contended that the arbitration clause
did not cover a claim arising under the California statute.1 22 The
Court addressed the matter by noting that the "arbitration
clause . . . provides for the arbitration of 'any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof"
and held that this language was "broad enough to cover" claims
under the California statute.123 But the Court did not pause to
consider whether the language of Section 2 was broad enough to
cover those same state statutory claims. Instead, it looked solely
to the language of the agreement between the parties.124
The Court continued to give the controversy limitation lan-
guage the silent treatment as it expanded the scope of the FAA.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. involved
an agreement to arbitrate "[a]ll disputes, controversies or differ-
ences which may arise between [the parties] out of or in relation
to" five of the fifteen articles of the parties' agreement for the dis-
tribution of vehicles.125 At issue in Mitsubishi Motors was the
question of the arbitrability under the FAA of claims arising un-
der the Sherman Act. 126
As noted above, the Court addressed the matter largely as a
policy concern about the competence of arbitrators to decide such
cases and held that the claims were arbitrable."2 This focus on
policy concerns apparently left no room for consideration of the
statute. The lower court's determination that the language of the
arbitration clause encompassed the statutory antitrust claims
was not squarely before the Court.' However, the Court did ad-
dress the suggestion that the arbitration provision's reference to
claims arising out of or in relation to only certain specified provi-
sions in the agreement meant that the arbitration provision
should be read narrowly to exclude claims arising under a stat-
ute.12 ' The Court quoted the language of the arbitration provision,
122. Id. at 15 n.7.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. 473 U.S. 614, 617 (1985) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 619-20; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
127. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 626-27, 640; see supra text accompanying notes
103-04.
128. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 624 & n.13.
129. Id. at 624 n.13.
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including the reference to disputes "in relation" to specified parts
of the agreement.' The Court observed that, but for the limita-
tion to specific parts of the underlying agreement, the arbitration
provision was "otherwise broad" and included the statutory claim
as well."' Indeed, the Court interpreted the broad arbitration
language to mean that all that was necessary was that the statu-
tory claims "touch matters" covered by the relevant parts of the
agreement. 3 2 This sounds much more like a claim that "relates
to" a portion of the agreement than a claim that "arises out of"
it 133it.
The Court then turned from the language of the private agree-
ment to the language of the FAA to address the argument that an
express agreement to arbitrate statutory claims is required.134 But
after carefully parsing the language of the private agreement, the
Court did not even mention the controversy limitation language
of Section 2."' The Court simply wrote that language out of exist-
ence by describing Section 2 as follows (and please note that the
ellipsis in the quotation is not mine-it was added by the Court):
"The Act's centerpiece provision makes a written agreement to
arbitrate 'in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce .. . valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."3
What language has the Court excised? The answer will hardly
be surprising: the Court eliminated the controversy language
(and this in a case that focused squarely on whether the FAA
should apply to a particular type of controversy). Instead, the
Court rejected, as a matter of policy, any presumption against the
arbitration of statutory claims and held that arbitration was a
perfectly suitable forum for the resolution of statutory claims.m
The Court acknowledged the possibility that "not ... all con-




133. See discussion infra Part IV.A (describing differences between a claim "arising
out" of a contract and a claim that "relates to" such a contract).
134. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 624-25.
135. Id. at 625-26.
136. Id. at 625 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1985)).
137. Id. at 625, 628.
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tion"13 8 but indicated that "it is the congressional intention ex-
pressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to
identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbi-
trate will be held unenforceable."' There is more than a little
irony here. The Court in Mitsubishi Motors focused closely on the
language of the statute out of which the claims arose (i.e., the
Sherman Act) to divine congressional intent.40 However, the
Court has largely ignored language of the FAA that explicitly re-
stricts the FAA's scope to only a narrow category of controver-
sies.14'
The dissenting opinion in Mitsubishi Motors, written by Justice
Stevens, did address to some degree both the language of the con-
tract and the language of the statute. The dissent first focused on
the language of the arbitration agreement and concluded that
"[a]s a matter of ordinary contract interpretation" the antitrust
claims were not within the scope of the agreement.14 2 According to
the dissent, the arbitration clause only applied to two-party dis-
putes and not the type of three-party dispute at issue in
Mitsubishi Motors.143 Additionally, and more relevant for purposes
of this article, the dissent observed that the arbitration provision
"only applie[d] to disputes 'which may arise between [the parties]
out of or in relation to [five articles of the fifteen article agree-
ment] or for the breach thereof."144 The dissent concluded that the
antitrust claim did not, in fact, "arise out of' those five articles
that dealt with very specific issues under the contract.145 This led
to a discussion by the dissent of whether the antitrust claim was
a dispute "in relation to" those five articles.14 6 The dissent stated
that the "in relation to" language meant that the claim must be
predicated on contractual rights defined in the five articles and
138. Id. at 627.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 635-36 (citing Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 210 sec. 7 (1890); Clayton
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, 731 sec. 4 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
15 (1982)) (other citations omitted). The Court similarly did so with respect to the Credit
Repair Organization Act in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. , ,132 S. Ct.
665, 672-73 (2012) (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627.
142. Id. at 643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 643-44.





that the antitrust claim was not.14 7 The dissent based its reason-
ing largely on a view that arbitration was not a desirable or effec-
tive forum for the resolution of statutory claims,"' citing Wilko
and Gardner-Denver in support of that proposition.14 9
In my view, the dissent missed both the point and an oppor-
tunity. The dissent recognized that there is a difference between
the "arising out of' and "in relation to" language but did not dis-
cuss the fact that the "in relation to" language is not in the
FAA.'s The dissent's analysis should have ended after the conclu-
sion that the claims did not arise out of the contract or its breach.
At any rate, because the dissent gave a narrow meaning to the
term "in relation to" (indicating that it meant the claims must be
"predicated on contractual rights").' and construed the language
of the statute narrowly, there was presumably no reason to dis-
cuss any discrepancy between them."'
The Court's expansion of the scope of the FAA has continued,
facilitated by a continuing disregard for the language of the stat-
ute. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
the Court addressed an arbitration provision in which the parties
agreed to arbitrate any controversies "relating to" the accounts
established through a standard customer agreement."' The Court
expressly overruled Wilko and held that claims arising under the
SEA of 1933 are subject to arbitration."4 However, the Court did
not so much as mention that the "relating to" language in the
agreement differed from the FAA's own scope provision.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 647-48.
149. Id. at 648-51 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974);
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953)).
150. Id. at 644-46.
151. Id. at 644.
152. A portion of Justice Stevens's dissent, in which only Justice Brennan joined, did
involve a discussion of Section 2's language, including the controversy limitation. Id. at
645-46. Justices Stevens and Brennan concluded that the "plain language of [Section 2]
encompasses Soler's claims that arise out of its contract with Mitsubishi, but does not en-
compass a claim arising under federal law, or indeed one that arises under its distributor
agreement." Id. at 646. But even in this portion of the opinion there was no discussion of
the discrepancy between the language of the statute and the language of the arbitration
agreement. See id. at 645-50. This is probably because for the dissent the "relating to"
language was no broader than the "arising out of' language. See id. at 645-46.
153. 490 U.S. 472, 478 (1989).
154. Id. at 485.
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In Green Tree Financial Corp. -Alabama v. Randolph, the Court
made clear that the FAA applied to disputes arising under the
Truth in Lending Act. 15 The arbitration provision in Randolph
(which the Court never compared to the language of the FAA)
was explicit in its breadth, stating in relevant part as follows:
All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this
Contract or the relationships which result from this Contract, or the
validity of this arbitration clause or the entire contract, shall be re-
solved by binding arbitration . ... The parties agree and understand
that all disputes arising under case law, statutory law, and all other
laws, including, but not limited to, all contract, tort, and property
disputes, will be subject to binding arbitration in accord with this
Contract. 56
The Court said nothing about the fact that this provision far ex-
ceeds the language of the FAA.
Occasionally, the Court will find language in an arbitration
provision insufficiently broad to cover a dispute. For instance, in
Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
Court indicated that an arbitration provision covering claims
"arising under" a collective bargaining agreement was "relatively
narrow" and did not encompass a dispute as to whether the col-
lective bargaining agreement was ratified because such a dispute
"concern[ed] the [collective bargaining agreement's] very exist-
ence."' Of course, "arising under" is not the same as "arising out
of," though it is a great deal closer to "arising out of' than it is to
"relating to." Indeed, the drafters of the New Jersey statute on
which Section 2's controversy limitation is modeled apparently
viewed "arising thereunder" as essentially synonymous with
"arising out of.""5
It is, at the very least, interesting that eliminating the "arising
out of and relating to" language and replacing it with "arising
under" is the difference between a "broad" arbitration provision
and a "relatively narrow" one. Surely it is worth noting that Sec-
tion 2 is much closer to what the Court itself has described as
"relatively narrow" language than it is to language the Court has
described as broad.
155. 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
156. Id. at 83.
157. 561 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2862 (2010) (citing Drake Batteries, Inc. v. Lo-
cal 50 Am. Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254, 256-57 (1962)).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
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D. Expanding the FAA Inward by Ignoring Its Language
The previous section describes what we can think of as an
"outward" expansion of the FAA. This outward expansion has
been characterized by judicial acceptance of language in private
agreements to expand the FAA outward to include agreements to
arbitrate disputes well beyond the FAA's contractual core. But
there has more recently been an inward expansion, as well. The
Court has used the extra-statutory language of arbitration provi-
sions to bring within the FAA disputes over the validity, scope,
and formation of an arbitration provision. The Court has essen-
tially ignored the language of the FAA to reach this result.
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the Court addressed
an arbitration provision that subjected to arbitration "[a]ll dis-
putes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this con-
tract."' In a plurality opinion, the Court noted that a dispute
about what an arbitration contract in each case means is a dis-
pute "relating to the contract."'60 The Court thus implicitly recog-
nized that "relating to" has its own reach and that "relating to"
differs from "arising from" (which, admittedly, differs slightly
from "arising out of"). However, the plurality opinion did not
acknowledge that the "relating to" language, although part of the
parties' agreement, was not in Section 2.
When a similar issue came before the Court recently in Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Court again addressed the mat-
ter by ignoring the conflict between the "relating to" language
and the language of the FAA."' Jackson involved two arbitration
provisions. One, which was not before the Court, covered "dis-
putes arising out of' an employee's employment with the other
party.6 2 The provision that was directly before the Court gave the
arbitrator "exclusive authority to resolve any dispute, relating to
the . . . enforceability. . . of this [arbitration] Agreement includ-
ing, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this
Agreement is void or voidable."16 ' Thus, the relevant scope provi-
sion included only the "relating to" language and not the "arising
159. 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003).
160. Id. at 451.
161. 561 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
162. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2777.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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out of' language. The "controversy" at issue was the unconsciona-
bility of the arbitration agreement. 164
The Court dealt with the mismatch between the language of
the FAA and the language of the provision at issue by editing. Re-
ferring to the language of Section 2, the Court noted that the
agreement contained "multiple 'written provision[s]' to 'settle by
arbitration a controversy.""" But the Court stopped there without
going on to the actual controversy limitation language that limits
arbitrable controversies to those that arise out of the contract. 16 6
Instead, the Court made clear that the agreement to arbitrate the
validity of the arbitration agreement was indeed within the scope
of the FAA and was a stand-alone agreement that could be en-
forced like any other arbitration agreement under the FAA.16 1
But, as discussed later, the contract from which the dispute must
arise is not the arbitration provision, but the contract containing
it. 16
III. THE CONTROVERSY LIMITATION'S LIMITED SCOPE
Ignoring the controversy limitation will not make it go away.
The scope of the FAA is limited to agreements to arbitrate con-
troversies that originate in the performance or breach of the con-
tract containing the arbitration provision." Congress's choice in
this regard was deliberate and should be respected.o
164. Id.
165. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
166. The Court did set out the text of Section 2 in its entirety earlier in the opinion. Id.
at -, 130 S. Ct. 2776 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
167. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 2777-78.
168. See discussion infra Part III.C.
169. I am not arguing that Congress limited the FAA to questions of fact as opposed to
questions of law. In a law review article co-authored with Kenneth Dayton, Julius Henry
Cohen, one of the primary drafters of the FAA, indicated that questions of law, so long as
they relate to contractual disputes, were properly the subject of arbitration. See infra
notes 193-94 and accompanying text. Nor am I arguing that Congress intended that only
disputes between sophisticated parties or merchants were intended to be subject to en-
forcement under the FAA. Many fine articles have argued this point. See, e.g., Horton, su-
pra note 109, at 455; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005). However, in my view Congress did not intend to restrict
the application of the FAA in this manner. See Stephen E. Friedman, Arbitration Provi-
sions: Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2050-55 (2011) (ar-
guing that Congress was aware that the FAA would apply to contracts with consumers).
170. There may be a handful of statutes that should be subject to arbitration under the
FAA. For instance, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code is a statute, but it is plainly
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A. A Deliberate and Unusual Deviation
Congress could easily have written a statute that covered
agreements to settle any controversy "arising between the parties
to the contract." This is, in fact, the language used in the New
York Arbitration Law."' The language of the New York Arbitra-
tion Law is broad enough to encompass virtually any type of dis-
pute.
As the Supreme Court has observed, for the most part the "text
of the FAA was based upon that of New York's arbitration stat-
ute."'72 But Congress deviated from the New York Arbitration
Law when it came to the controversy limitation and instead fol-
lowed the language of the 1923 New Jersey Arbitration Law.'73
The New Jersey Arbitration Law differs in a crucial way from the
New York Arbitration Law. The New Jersey version provides two
separate statements of scope-a broad scope for agreements to
arbitrate existing disputes (towards which courts did not histori-
cally express any hostility) and a narrower one for pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.174 With respect to the arbitration of exist-
ing disputes, the New Jersey Arbitration Law was quite broad
and applied to agreements to arbitrate an existing controversy
"which arises out of a contract or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof or the violation of any other obligation."
Such a broad clause would, of course, cover not only a dispute
arising out of the contract (or its breach), but also a dispute aris-
ing from the violation of any other common law or statutory obli-
gation. In contrast, with respect to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, the New Jersey law included a much narrower range
of agreements, covering only agreements to arbitrate "a contro-
contract law, dealing as it does with matters of contract formation, construction, perfor-
mance, breach, and remedies. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to -210 (2011) (Part 2, dealing
with "Form, Formation and Readjustment of Contract"); id. §§ 2-301 to -328 (Part 3, deal-
ing with "General Obligation and Construction of Contract"); id. §§ 2-501 to -515 (Part 5,
dealing with "Performance"); id. §§ 2-601 to -616 (Part 6, dealing with "Breach, Repudia-
tion and Excuse"); id. §§ 2-701 to -725 (Part 7, dealing with "Remedies").
171. New York Arbitration Law § 2 (1920), reprinted in A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 92 (current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7501
(CONSOL. 2007)).
172. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008).
173. Compare United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 sec. 2
(1925), with Act of Mar. 21, 1923, ch. 134, 1923 N.J. Laws 291 § 1.
174. Act of Mar. 21, 1923, §§ 1-2.
175. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
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versy thereafter arising out of the contract or the refusal to per-
form the whole or any part thereof.""'
This narrower language is almost the exact language adopted
in Section 2 of the FAA."' This language stands in sharp contrast
to the broad language of the New York Arbitration Law, which
provides for the arbitrability of all disputes that may arise be-
tween the parties.1
The statement accompanying the bill that ultimately became
the New Jersey Arbitration Law makes clear that a "controversy
thereafter arising out of the contract or the refusal to perform"
the contract is actually a narrow category of controversies."' The
statement notes that the bill's purpose, with respect to pre-
dispute arbitration provisions, was "to make a clause in a con-
tract providing for arbitration of controversies arising thereunder
valid, enforceable and irrevocable just as any other clause of the
contract.""'o The drafters of the legislation considered only contro-
versies "arising thereunder" (i.e., arising under the contract) to be
within the scope of the statute.m1 As noted earlier, the Supreme
Court described the phrase "arising under," when used in an arbi-
tration provision, to be "relatively narrow."'
The choice of the New Jersey version over the New York ver-
sion is quite telling. In Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,
the Court made much of the fact that when it came to the judicial
review of the decisions of arbitrators, Congress selected the ap-
proach of the New York Arbitration Law and not the different ap-
proach of the Illinois Arbitration and Awards Act." Given that
the FAA is largely based on the New York Arbitration Law,184 the
176. Id. § 1.
177. Compare id., with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The FAA, as previously noted, applies to
written provisions in interstate contracts or maritime contracts to settle by arbitration "a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
178. See New York Arbitration Law § 2 (1920), reprinted in A TREATISE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 92 (current version at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 7501 (CONSOL. 2007)).
179. S. 58, 147th Leg. (N.J. 1923).
180. James B. Boskey, A History of Commercial Arbitration in New Jersey, 8 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 284, 286 n.15 (quoting S. 58).
181. See id.
182. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
183. 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008).
184. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924)).
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choice to deviate from the New York Arbitration Law and to fol-
low the New Jersey version is even more telling than the choice
described in Hall Street Associates.
B. Legislative History and Early Commentary
The legislative history of the FAA and early commentary on
the FAA strongly support the conclusion that Congress intended
the statute to apply only to the arbitration of claims arising out of
contractual obligations. The Senate Report, for example, de-
scribes the state of the law that the FAA was designed to correct
as follows: "[I]f an action at law were brought on the contract con-
taining the agreement to arbitrate, [the arbitration] agreement
could not be pleaded in bar of the action."
Additionally, during the debate in the House of Representa-
tives, the chairman of the House Committee, Representative
Mills (who was also a sponsor of the legislation),"' was asked to
explain the bill.' He responded as follows: "This bill provides
that where there are commercial contracts and there is disagree-
ment under the contract, the court can force an arbitration
agreement in the same way as other portions of the contract."88
Congress apparently had in mind disputes about the contract it-
self, not a broader range of controversies.
Alexander Rose of the Arbitration Society of America, New
York City, testified at the joint hearings before the relevant sub-
committees of the House and the Senate that the FAA was de-
signed to correct "the fact that the courts held right straight along
that it was not competent for parties to agree on an arbitration of
an entire controversy."' Rose continued, making clear that the
''entire controversy" was comprised of liability under the contract
in which the arbitration provision was contained:
They [the parties to a contract] could agree [to arbitration] upon
some incidental features-whether some work on a building contract
had been properly performed; whether a payment was due; whether
some matter of value was to be determined as an incidental matter,
185. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (emphasis added).
186. Piatt, supra note 17, at 153.
187. 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 25 (statement of Alexander Rose, Arbitration
Society of America).
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but the question of liability under the whole contract was one which
the courts assumed to take away from the parties. 90
Commentary contemporaneous with the passage of the FAA
bears out the proposition that the FAA was designed to cover con-
troversies arising out of the private orderings of the party. Julius
Henry Cohen, who served as general counsel for the New York
State Chamber of Commerce"' and who was a principal drafter of
the FAA,'92 observed in a law review article published shortly af-
ter the passage of the FAA: "Not all questions arising out of con-
tracts ought to be arbitrated. It is a remedy peculiarly suited to
the disposition of the ordinary [business] disputes between mer-
chants as to questions of fact-quantity, quality, time of delivery,
compliance with terms of payment, excuses for non-performance,
and the like.""
The article noted that some of the "simpler questions of law"
were also appropriate for arbitration-"the passage of title, the
existence of warranties, or the questions of law which are com-
plementary to" the types of questions of fact already discussed.'94
All of the issues set forth in the article as appropriate for arbitra-
tion, whether questions of fact or questions of law and whether
common law or statutory, relate squarely to contractual dis-
putes.19 5
Other contemporaneous articles by leading scholars support
the proposition that the FAA was designed to deal with breaches
of the contract containing the arbitration provision. In a 1931 ar-
ticle that has been described as the "most comprehensive study of
the [FAA] in its early years,"' the authors note the confusion
about the FAA that arose "from the fact that the arbitration con-
tract itself creates a right to a particular remedy for breach of the
main contract, which remedy, if pursued to judgment affirming
the award, extinguishes rights on both contracts."'97 A "breach of
190. Id.
191. Id. at 13 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State
Chamber of Commerce).
192. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008) (describing Cohen as
"one of the primary drafters of both the 1920 New York Act and the ... FAA").
193. Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265, 281 (1926).
194. Id.
195. See id. at 278-86.
196. MACNEIL, supra note 22, at 126.
197. Baum & Pressman, supra note 17, at 458.
[Vol. 46:10051034
ARBITRATION ACT
the main contract" is apparently the matter to be arbitrated.""
Similarly, a leading treatise from 1930 on arbitration law notes
that "it seems clear that [Section 2 and other similar provisions in
state arbitration laws] do not embrace an agreement to arbitrate
a future dispute unless that dispute is such as shall arise be-
tween the parties with respect to some general contract existing
between them."'99
It seems clear that Congress had in mind that a comparatively
narrow range of controversies-only those involving contract
claims-would fall within the scope of the FAA.
C. Critiquing the Inward Expansion
The expansion of the FAA inward, as courts place the arbitra-
tion of controversies about the arbitration provision itself within
the scope of the FAA, also raises many issues.
Section 2 covers "a written provision in any maritime transac-
tion or [in] a contract [in interstate] commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract."o
What is meant by "such contract"? Arguably it is the contract con-
taining the arbitration agreement (i.e., the contract which the ar-
bitration provision is "in"). If so, this would mean arbitration un-
der the FAA is not intended to cover disputes regarding the
arbitration provision itself (i.e., validity, scope, or formation).20 1
It might seem strange to treat the arbitration provision and the
"container contract" as separate, but this is common practice for
the Court in its arbitration jurisprudence. The Court has made
clear that for purposes of enforcement "as a matter of substantive
federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from
the remainder of the contract."20 2 This "severability" doctrine is
based on Section 2's language that makes written provisions to
arbitrate enforceable without mention of the validity of the con-
198. See id.
199. A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, supra note 16, at 103.
200. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
201. Cf. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2847,
2862 (2010) (holding that an arbitration provision that covered disputes "arising under" a
collective bargaining agreement did not cover a dispute over the ratification date of the
agreement).
202. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006).
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tract in which they are contained.2 0 ' Thus, when a challenge is
made to a part of the contract other than the arbitration provi-
sion, a court will separate the arbitration provision from the rest
of the contract and enforce it under the FAA.20 4 Indeed, the Court
has recently noted that "in cases governed by the [FAA, the
Court] must treat the arbitration clause as severable from the
contract in which it appears."205
Further, Sections 3 and 4 call for judicial determination of con-
troversies relating to the arbitration provision. Section 3 provides
for a stay of litigation if the court determines the issues in litiga-
tion are "referable to arbitration under" the terms of the relevant
agreement.2 06 Section 4 provides for the court or the jury to de-
termine issues relating to the "making" of the arbitration agree-
ment.207 These two provisions are not necessarily binding on state
courts in the way that Section 2 is.205 But they strongly suggest
Congress assumed that disputes about the arbitration provision
would be decided by courts, not by arbitrators.
Congressional intent in this regard is made clearer from the
FAA's legislative history. For instance, in his testimony before
the relevant congressional subcommittees, Julius Henry Cohen
observed that a party resisting enforcement in the good faith be-
lief that the arbitration agreement "does not bind him to arbi-
trate, or that the agreement is not applicable to the controversy,
is protected by the provision of the law which requires the court
to examine into the merits of such a claim."20' Judicial determina-
203. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010)
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
204. Id.
205. Granite Rock Co., 561 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2857 (footnote omitted) (citation
omitted).
206. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2006).
207. Id. § 4.
208. At one point the Court indicated that Section 3 was binding on state courts. See
Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) (noting that
state courts as well as federal courts were bound to issue stays under Section 3). The
Court later backed off of this a bit, noting that "we have never held that [Sections] 3 and 4,
which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court ... are nonethe-
less applicable in state court." Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6 (1989) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988)).
209. Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 35 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen, General
Counsel, New York State Chamber of Commerce).
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tions of the scope and existence of the arbitration agreement are
built into the FAA.210
IV. ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS
This article has endeavored to establish that Congress intend-
ed the FAA to apply only to the arbitration of contract disputes
arising under the agreement that contains the arbitration provi-
sion. Such a reading raises a number of possible objections that
deserve to be addressed. For instance, it might be argued that
"arising out of' and "relating to" are synonymous. Additionally, it
might be argued that the federal policy favoring arbitration man-
dates the current broad scope for the FAA. Further, it may be
that the reference in Section 2 to a controversy arising out of a
"transaction" actually indicates a broad scope for the FAA. Final-
ly, it might be argued that if courts were to take the language of
the controversy limitation seriously the result would be a bifurca-
tion of claims into arbitrable disputes that would proceed to arbi-
tration and nonarbitrable disputes that would proceed to litiga-
tion. Each of these four objections are addressed in turn.
A. "Arising out of' and "Relating to" Not Synonymous
This article has made much of the fact that the "relating to"
language found so frequently in arbitration provisions is not
found in Section 2. Perhaps, it might be argued, "relating to" and
"arising out of' are simply synonyms. They are not.
There is a fundamental difference between a controversy "aris-
ing out of' a contract or its breach, as stated in Section 2, and a
controversy either "arising out of' or "relating to" such a contract.
The "relating to" language found in so many arbitration provi-
sions is not mere surplusage. If "relating to" were merely synon-
ymous with "arising out of' then there would be no reason for
210. See generally David Horton, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 3 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2010/04/02/horton.pdf (arguing that Section 4 calls for court determinations of issues re-
lated to the making of the arbitration agreement).
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parties to include both phrases.2 1' The purpose of such language is
clear-to make "any" and "all" disputes arbitrable.2 12
The term "relating to" is fundamentally different from the
statutory language "arising out of." The definitions of these and
similar terms in a number of dictionaries demonstrate the point.
Inherent in most definitions of "arising" is the concept of "origina-
tion." So, for example, one dictionary defines "arise" as "to origi-
nate from a specified source."' Another defines it as "[t]o come
into being; originate" or "[t]o result, issue, or proceed."2 14 While
"arise" and "arising" sound in the concept of issuing or originat-
ing, the word "relate" is much broader and requires not origina-
tion but mere connectedness. Thus, one dictionary defines "relate"
as "to be in relationship" or "have reference" and "related" as
merely "having relationship."2 15 Another defines "relate" as "[t]o
have connection, relation, or reference" and "relation" as "[a] logi-
cal or natural association between two or more things."216 Thus,
while a claim that "arises out of' a contract must originate in a
contract, a claim that "relates to" a contract would merely need to
be connected to it in some way.
A dictionary contemporaneous with the passage of the FAA,
the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, evidences
these same differences in meaning between the words. This is the
dictionary the Court looked to in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson in order to determine how Congress would have under-
stood "involving commerce" as compared to "affecting commerce"
at the time Congress enacted the FAA. 217 As in the more modern
dictionaries, the word "arising" is defined in terms of origination.
Thus, "arise" is defined in relevant part as "[t]o spring forth, as a
river, from its source," "[t]o spring up, come into existence," or
211. Cf. 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.11 (3d ed. 2004)
(footnote omitted) ("[Contracts are] therefore to be read as a whole and an interpretation
that gives effect to every part of the agreement is favored over one that makes some part
of it mere surplusage.").
212. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
213. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 117 (Philip Babcock Gove et
al. eds., 1993).
214. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 76 (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds.,
4th ed. 2002).
215. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 213, at 1916.
216. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 214, at 1173.
217. See 513 U.S. 265, 274 (1995); discussion supra Part I.C.2.
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"[t]o spring, originate, or result from."218 Similarly, "arising" is de-
fined as "[s]pringing up, origination."2 19
In contrast, this dictionary defines "relation" as "any connex-
ion, correspondence, or association, which can be conceived as
naturally existing between things."22' For things to be "related"
they need only have a "mutual relation or connexion."221 "Arising
out of' and "relating to" are two very different concepts.
Some courts have noted the distinction between language "aris-
ing out of' and "relating to." For example, in Tracer Research
Corp. v. National Environmental Services Co., the court criticized
a litigant for relying largely on cases interpreting arbitration
clauses with "arising out of or relating to" language to argue for
an expansive scope for an arbitration provision that did not in-
clude the "relating to" language.2 22 The court noted that the "reli-
ance on these cases is misplaced. The omission of the 'relating to'
language is 'significant."'
223
Had Congress intended to include the "relating to" language in
Section 2, it would have. The phrase "relating to" does appear
elsewhere in the statute, apparently meaning "having something
to do with." For example, Section 1 of the FAA defines "[m]ari-
time transactions" to include agreements "relating to wharfage,
supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any
other matters in foreign commerce."224 The context shows a broad
meaning for "relating to."
Similarly, in describing the effect of a judgment entered under
the FAA, the statute provides that such judgment "shall have the
same force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the
provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action."225 Once
218. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 445-46 (photo. reprint 1976) (James A.H. Mur-
ray et al. eds., 1933).
219. Id. at 446.
220. Id. at 398.
221. Id. at 397.
222. See 42 F.3d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994).
223. Id. (quoting Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464
(9th Cir. 1983)). But see Sweet Dreams Unlimited, Inc. v. Dial-A-Mattress Int'l Ltd., 1 F.3d
639, 642 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e do not believe that adding 'relating to' to 'arising out of
substantially broadens the scope of the clause . . . ."); Simitar Entm't, Inc. v. Silva Entm't,
Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994-96 (D. Minn. 1999) (criticizing the distinction drawn by
courts between "arising out of' and "relating to").
224. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. § 13.
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again, "relating to" is used by Congress to essentially mean "hav-
ing something to do with."
B. The "Liberal Policy"
Is a narrower scope for the FAA in conflict with what the Court
has described as Section 2's "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-
tration"?226 After all, the Court has indicated that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard" for that
policy and "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."22 7 This "liberal federal
policy" does not require a scope for the FAA that is unmoored
from the language of the FAA. The liberal federal policy is rele-
vant to determining whether a given dispute is within the scope
of an arbitration provision in a contract.' As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently noted, "[a]ny
'preference' for arbitration is reserved for the interpretation of the
scope of a valid arbitration clause."229
Even in that situation, however, the policy does not mandate
automatic inclusion if the language will not bear it. In Granite
Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Court
considered whether a dispute about an agreement date of ratifica-
tion was within the scope of an arbitration provision that covered
disputes "arising under" the agreement.2 30 The Court held that
the "presumption favoring arbitration [could not] cure" the fact
that the dispute was beyond the provision's scope because the
dispute went to the very existence of the contract and so could not
be said to arise under it.231
Moreover, it is unclear how, or even if, this prescription to con-
sider the pro-arbitration policy in deciding questions of arbitrabil-
226. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. __ , 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
227. Moses H. Cone Ment'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
228. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (indicating that the federal policy in favor of arbitration dictates that doubts con-
cerning the scope of arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitration).
229. Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp., 615 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing AT&T
Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1986)).
230. 561 U.S. -, -, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2862 (2010).
231. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 2862.
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ity (a prescription the Court has described as "vague")23 2 should be
applied to a question of statutory interpretation. The Court's ju-
risprudence on the scope of the FAA in interstate commerce is in-
structive. In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, the Court con-
sidered the appropriate breadth of the statute to determine to
what range of interstate transactions Section 2 applied.233 Inter
estingly, although the Court had many bases for reading the lan-
guage of Section 2 broadly, it did not mention the "liberal federal
policy" in favor of arbitration in its determination. This supports
the conclusion that the liberal federal policy may not be particu-
larly relevant to determining the scope of the statute itself.
More fundamentally, though, even a liberal policy favoring ar-
bitration cannot overcome the actual language of the statute (as
fleshed out by its legislative history). A liberal federal policy could
not lead to a reading that eliminated or modified the requirement
that an arbitration provision be in writing to trigger enforcement
under Section 2.23 Nor can a liberal policy expand the FAA be-
yond the types of controversies set forth in Section 2.
C. Not That Kind of Transaction
Another possible objection to this article's argument about the
scope of the FAA might be that the FAA applies, according to Sec-
tion 2, to agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of cer-
tain contracts or "transaction[s] .", That is, Section 2 makes en-
forceable "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction."2
This might lead one to conclude that Congress intended a fairly
broad scope for the FAA because a "transaction" is generally con-
sidered much broader than a mere "contract." A leading law dic-
tionary defines "transaction" as the "act or . . . instance of con-
ducting business or other dealings."' If the FAA applies to an
agreement to arbitrate a controversy arising out of the underlying
232. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. _, _, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1902 n.5
(2009).
233. 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995); see also discussion supra Part I.C.2.
234. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
235. Id.
236. See id. (emphasis added).
237. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1635 (9th ed. 2009).
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"transaction," broadly defined, then the scope of the FAA would
extend beyond mere contractual disputes.
But the FAA is not referring to "transaction" in the broad
sense. The ambiguity flows from the fact that Section 2 actually
uses the word "transaction" three times with two different mean-
ings. The FAA covers "[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof."2"
The FAA's legislative history includes some discussion of the
ambiguity of the word "transaction." During the Senate debate
over the bill that became the FAA, Senator Caraway expressed
some concern about the way the word "transaction" was used in
Section 2. Addressing Senator Sterling, who was one of the spon-
sors of the bill,239 Senator Caraway stated:
I was going to suggest to the Senator that the language, "a written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction," would seem to be rather remarkable .... I take it that
a transaction is something we do and I do not see how there could be
240
such a thing as "a written provision in an act" that we do.
He continued, noting that "a transaction is an act, it is something
people do, and it is not a written contract."2 41 Senator Sterling re-
plied that he was "quite content to leave [sic] the language stand
as it is."24 2 Senator Caraway responded as follows: "Should that be
done, it would certainly be a monument to the Senator. I am per-
fectly willing for him to erect it."243
The ambiguity that Senator Caraway raised is easily cleared
up. It is possible that Senator Caraway had in mind an earlier
version of the statute in which there was indeed a reference to a
written provision being in an interstate transaction.2 44 But the
238. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
239. Piatt, supra note 17, at 153.
240. 66 CONG. REC. 2761 (1925) (statement of Sen. Caraway).
241. Id.
242. Id. (statement of Sen. Sterling).
243. Id. at 2762 (statement of Sen. Caraway).
244. Section 2, in an earlier version under consideration, referred to "a written provi-
sion in any contract or maritime transaction or transaction involving commerce." H.R. 646,
68th Cong. § 2 (1924), reprinted in Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (as passed by the
House of Representatives and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee, June 7, 1924).
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FAA, as adopted, does not contain any ambiguity. There is no
ambiguity or problem with a reference to a written provision be-
ing in a "maritime transaction" because the term "maritime
transaction" is specifically defined in Section 1 of the FAA as a
maritime contract. Maritime transactions are defined as "charter
parties, bills of lading of water carriers" as well as all manner of
agreements, such as those "relating to wharfage, supplies fur-
nished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other mat-
ters in foreign commerce" that would be within the admiralty ju-
risdiction.245
To be sure, Section 2 also references a second type of "transac-
tion."246 Section 2 refers to a provision in a contract "evidencing a
transaction" in interstate commerce, and this is clearly something
different from and broader than the "maritime transaction."24 7 So,
when the statute refers to a controversy "arising out of such con-
tract or transaction," does it mean the narrow "maritime transac-
tion" or the broader interstate transaction?
It means the narrower type of transaction-a maritime trans-
action. The reference to "such contract or transaction" almost cer-
tainly parallels the reference to the written arbitration provision
being in either a contract in interstate commerce or a maritime
transaction. 248 The "transaction in commerce" simply describes
the type of contract that is referenced (i.e., "such contract" is a
contract that evidences a "transaction in commerce"). If "such . . .
transaction" meant the transaction in interstate commerce, then
there would be no reference to controversies arising from the
maritime transaction, even though Congress obviously intended
to include such controversies within the scope of the FAA. Final-
ly, the FAA speaks of a failure to "perform" the contract or trans-
action in whole or in part.249 It is far more natural to speak of fail-
ing to perform a contract or agreement than of failing to perform
a "transaction" (i.e., an "act or instance of conducting business or
245. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
246. See id. § 2.
247. Compare id., with id. § 1.
248. See id. § 2.
249. Id. § 1.
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other dealings").250 The narrower "maritime transaction" must be
what Congress intended here."'
The Court's recent opinion in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. leaves little doubt that "such transaction" re-
fers to a maritime transaction.2 52 In that case, the Court noted
that "the FAA provides, in pertinent part, that a 'written provi-
sion in any maritime transaction' calling for the arbitration of a
controversy arising out of such transaction" shall be enforceable,
making clear that "such" transaction is the maritime transac-
tion. 253
D. Bifurcation: A "Misfortune," Not a Catastrophe
Finally, some might take issue with one of the practical effects
of this article's argument, namely that adhering to the language
of Section 2 will result in the bifurcation of actions into arbitrable
parts that will proceed to arbitration and nonarbitrable parts
that will be subject to litigation. While such bifurcation is admit-
tedly not ideal, it is also not as problematic as it might seem at
first. As one court has noted, when it comes to the FAA "there
most clearly is not" a policy evincing the avoidance of piecemeal
litigation."'
At least two Supreme Court cases demonstrate that, while bi-
furcation is a legitimate concern, it is not an overriding one. In
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
the Court was faced with a scenario in which a hospital had as-
serted claims against both a general contractor and an archi-
tect.255 While the contractor had agreed to arbitration, the archi-
250. BLACK'S, supra note 237, at 1635.
251. One might wonder why the reference is to "such contract or transaction" instead of
"such transaction or contract." After all, earlier in Section 2 the reference to the transac-
tion comes first. This is presumably a vestige from an earlier draft version of the statute in
which the reference to the contract preceded the reference to the transaction. The original
version of Section 2 referred to a written provision "in any contract or maritime transac-
tion or transaction involving commerce." H.R. 646, 68th Cong. § 2 (1924), reprinted in
Joint Hearings, supra note 14, at 3.
252. 559 U.S. -, , 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010).
253. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
254. Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int'l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 467
(6th Cir. 2009).
255. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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tect had not.256 Thus, granting the contractor's request for arbitra-
tion would result in piecemeal litigation-claims against the con-
tractor would be arbitrated, and claims against the architect
would be subject to litigation.5 Although such bifurcation repre-
sented a "misfortune," it did not override the language of the
FAA, which called for the enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment between the hospital and the contractor.258
Similarly, in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of how a court should proceed when
faced with some claims that are arbitrable and some that are
not."' Specifically, the Court addressed whether a court should
refrain from compelling the arbitration of claims that were sub-
ject to arbitration in order to avoid the piecemeal resolution of the
dispute.2 o The Court held that it was proper to proceed with arbi-
tration for the arbitrable claims and litigation for the nonarbitra-
ble claims. 261 Thus, concerns about bifurcation and piecemeal liti-
gation could not override the intent of Congress (i.e., that claims
which the parties had agreed to arbitrate and that are within the
scope of the FAA be subject to arbitration).
The Court in Byrd noted that the potential for bifurcation is ac-
tually built into the FAA in that the FAA does not require parties
to arbitrate every possible claim. 262 Accordingly, bifurcation is a
possibility every time parties agree to arbitrate only some types
of claims. Bifurcation cannot be said to contradict the intent of
Congress."' In fact, it is the position of this article that not only
would such bifurcation not frustrate congressional intent, it
would actually effectuate it.
256. Id. at 19-20.
257. Id. at 20.
258. Id.
259. 470 U.S. 213, 214 (1985). This case was decided before it had been made clear that
federal securities claims could be subject to arbitration and thus addressed a situation in
which some claims were arbitrable while the federal securities claims were not. Id at 215-
16 & n.1.
260. See id. at 218.
261. Id. at 217.
262. See id. at 221.
263. Id. at 219.
264. See id.
20121 1045
1046 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1005
V. CONCLUSION
Jurisprudence on the scope of the FAA's controversy limitation
has focused on the language of the arbitration provision and the
competence of arbitrators to resolve various types of disputes.
What has been missing from this analysis is a meaningful consid-
eration of the actual language of the FAA. This article has sought
to expose that state of affairs and the Supreme Court's curious
deferral to the language found in private arbitration provisions.
Not only has the Court ignored the language of the FAA, but ig-
noring that language has led to a very different FAA from the one
Congress envisioned or intended. This article urges a renewed fo-
cus on the language of the statute as a means of restoring the
balance Congress struck in passing the FAA.
